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Abstract
1 A Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel model is considered, where there
exists a transmitter equipped with multiple antennas, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper each
equipped with a single antenna. We study the problem of finding the optimal input covariance that
achieves ergodic secrecy capacity subject to a power constraint where only statistical information about
the eavesdropper channel is available at the transmitter. This is a non-convex optimization problem that is
in general difficult to solve. Existing results address the case in which the eavesdropper or/and legitimate
channels have independent and identically distributed Gaussian entries with zero-mean and unit-variance,
i.e., the channels have trivial covariances. This paper addresses the general case where eavesdropper and
legitimate channels have nontrivial covariances. A set of equations describing the optimal input covariance
matrix are proposed along with an algorithm to obtain the solution. Based on this framework, we show
that when full information on the legitimate channel is available to the transmitter, the optimal input
covariance has always rank one. We also show that when only statistical information on the legitimate
channel is available to the transmitter, the legitimate channel has some general non-trivial covariance, and
the eavesdropper channel has trivial covariance, the optimal input covariance has the same eigenvectors
as the legitimate channel covariance. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the algorithm.
Index Terms
Ergodic secrecy capacity, MISO wiretap channel, beamforming.
1Work supported by the Office of Naval Research under grant ONR-N-00010710500 and the National Science Foundation
under grant CNS-0905425.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless physical (PHY) layer based security from a information-theoretic point of view has received
considerable attention recently [1]. Such approaches exploit the physical characteristics of the wireless
channel to enhance the security of communication systems. The wiretap channel, first introduced and
studied by Wyner [2], is the most basic physical layer model that captures the problem of communication
security. Wyner showed that when an eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of the legitimate
channel, the source and destination can achieve a positive information rate (secrecy rate). The maximal
secrecy rate from the source to the destination is defined as the secrecy capacity; for the degraded wiretap
channel the secrecy capacity is given as the largest between zero and the difference between the capacity
at the legitimate receiver and the capacity at the eavesdropper. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the
outputs at the legitimate receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN), was studied in [3]. Along the same lines, the secrecy capacity of a deterministic Gaussian MIMO
wiretap channel has been studied recently in [4]-[8]. In [9], the achievable rate in Gaussian MISO channels
was studied. In that context, the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel was assumed to
be available, but only statistical information about the eavesdropper channel was assumed to be available
at the transmitter. In [9] it was shown that when the eavesdropper channel is a vector of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean complex circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables, i.e.,
the channel has a trivial covariance matrix, the optimal communication strategy is beamforming, and that
the beamforming direction depends on the CSI of the legitimate channel. In [10], the authors derived the
ergodic secrecy capacity of a Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel where only statistical information about
the legitimate and eavesdropper channels are available at the transmitter. It was shown that a circularly
symmetric Gaussian input is optimal. It was also shown in the same paper that when the eavesdropper
and legitimate channels have i.i.d. Gaussian entries with zero-mean and unit-variance (trivial covariance),
a circularly symmetric Gaussian input with diagonal covariance is optimal.
In this paper, we consider a Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel and assume
that only statistical information about the the eavesdropper channel is available at the transmitter. Re-
garding the legitimate channel, we consider two scenarios: a) only statistical information of the legitimate
channel is available at the transmitter; b) full CSI on the legitimate channel is available at the transmitter.
We extend the result of [9] and [10] proposed for the case of multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap
channel with trivial channel covariances to the case of nontrivial covariances. The non-trivial channel
covariance matrix corresponds to the case where there exists statistical correlation between the channel
June 6, 2018 DRAFT
2coefficients of different transmit-receive antenna pairs. Such cases arise when the transmit and receive
antennas are closely spaced relative to the signal wavelength. We address the problem of finding the
optimal input covariance that achieves ergodic secrecy capacity subject to a power constraint. This leads
to a non-convex optimization problem. The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We derive a set of equations for the optimal input covariance matrix, and propose an algorithm to
obtain the solution (please refer to Theorem 1 of Section IV).
• We show that when the legitimate channel is completely known at the transmitter, in addition to the
conditions of Theorem 1, the following hold: 1) the optimal input covariance matrix has rank one;
2) the ergodic secrecy rate is increasing with the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
• We show that when only statistical information on the legitimate channel is available to the transmit-
ter, the legitimate channel has some general non-trivial covariance, and the eavesdropper channel has
trivial covariance, the optimal input covariance has the same eigenvectors as the legitimate channel
covariance.
• We show that under high SNR, the optimal input covariance has rank one.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The mathematical model is introduced in §II.
In §III, we give the explicit expression of ergodic secrecy rate, and in §IV, we derive the condition for
optimal input covariance. In §V, we analyze the dependence of ergodic secrecy rate on the SNR, and in
§VI, we study the ergodic secrecy rate under high SNR. In §VII, an algorithm is proposed to search for
the solution. Numerical results are presented in §VIII to illustrate the proposed algorithm. Finally, §IX
gives a brief conclusion. Several proofs appear in an Appendix.
A. Notation
Upper case and lower case bold symbols denote matrices and vectors, respectively. Superscripts ∗,
T and † denote respectively conjugate, transposition and conjugate transposition. det(A) and Tr(A)
denote the determinant and trace of matrix A, respectively. λmax(A) and λmin(A) denote the largest and
smallest eigenvalues of A, respectively. A  0 means that A is Hermitian positive semi-definite, and
A ≻ 0 means that A is Hermitian positive definite. diag(a) denotes a diagonal matrix with the elements
of the vector a along its diagonal. ‖a‖ denotes Euclidean norm of vector a. In denotes the identity matrix
of order n (the subscript is dropped when the dimension is obvious). E{·} denotes expectation operator.
In this paper, log(·) denotes base-e logarithm where e = 2.71828 · · · .
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Fig. 1. System model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider a Gaussian MISO wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter is equipped with
nT antennas, while the legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper each have a single antenna. The received
signals at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are respectively given by
yR = h
†
Rx+ vR, (1)
yE = h
†
Ex+ vE (2)
where x is the nT × 1 transmitted signal vector with zero mean and nT ×nT covariance matrix Rx  0,
i.e., x ∼ CN (0,Rx); hR, hE are respectively channel vectors between the transmitter and legitimate
receiver, and between the transmitter and eavesdropper; vR ∼ CN (0, σ2v), vE ∼ CN (0, σ2v) are the noises
at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. We can represent Rx in terms of the average
signal energy Es and normalized signal covariance matrix Q, so that Rx = EsQ and Tr(Q) = 1. The
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is defined as ρ , Es/σ2v .
We assume that full CSI is available at both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and only
the statistical information on the eavesdropper channel is available at the transmitter. We consider two
cases, depending on the type of information available at the transmitter on the legitimate channel:
a) Only statistical information on the legitimate channel is available at the transmitter, i.e., the trans-
mitter knows the distributions of hR and hE given by hR ∼ CN (0,ΣR), hE ∼ CN (0,ΣE) with
covariances ΣR ≻ 0, and ΣE ≻ 0, respectively. The ergodic secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MISO
wiretap system (2) equals [10]
Cs , max
Q0,Tr(Q)=1
Cs(Q) (3)
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4where Cs(Q) is the ergodic secrecy rate given by
Cs(Q) = EhR{log(1 + ρh
†
RQhR)}
− EhE{log(1 + ρh
†
EQhE)}. (4)
b) Full CSI on the legitimate channel is available at the transmitter. The ergodic secrecy rate is given
by [9]
Cs(Q) = log(1 + ρh
†
RQhR)− EhE{log(1 + ρh
†
EQhE)}. (5)
The transmitter optimization problem is to find the optimal input covariance matrix Q to maximize
Cs(Q) for cases a) and b). We denote the feasible set as Ω = {Q|Q  0,Tr(Q) = 1} which is a convex
set.
The problem is of interest when a positive secrecy rate can be achieved, i.e., Cs(Q) > 0 for some Q.
The conditions to ensure a positive ergodic capacity are provided in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: For hR ∼ CN (0,ΣR), the sufficient and necessary condition under which Cs(Q) > 0 for
some Q is that ΣR −ΣE is non negative semi-definite.
The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2: When hR is completely known at the transmitter, a sufficient condition under which
Cs(Q) > 0 for some Q is that hRh†R −ΣE is non negative semi-definite.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
III. CALCULATION OF ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
The calculation of the ergodic secrecy rate involves calculation of terms like Ez{log(1+ρz†Qz)} with
z ∼ CN (0,R). To this end, following the analysis of [11, Eq. (64)], we give the following lemma. The
proof is given in Appendix C.
Lemma 3: LetR1/2QR1/2 have a eigen-decompositionU1D1U†1 whereD1 = diag(d1, · · · , dM , 0, · · · , 0),
and d1 > · · · > dM > 0 are the M non-zero eigenvalues. For z ∼ CN (0,R), it holds:
Ez{log(1 + ρz
†Qz)} =
M∑
j=1
F1(ρdj)∏M
i 6=j(1− di/dj)
(6)
where F1(x) = e1/xE1(1/x) with E1(x) =
∫∞
x
e−t
t dt being the exponential integral.
Based on (6), we can calculate Cs(Q) by simply letting R = ΣR or R = ΣE .
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5IV. CONDITIONS FOR OPTIMAL INPUT COVARIANCE
Next we obtain the necessary conditions for the optimal Q by using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
conditions. Let us construct the cost function
L(Q, θ,Ψ) = Cs(Q)− θ(Tr(Q)− 1) + Tr(ΨQ) (7)
where θ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint Tr(Q) = 1, and Ψ is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the constraint Q  0. The KKT conditions enable us to write [20]
Θ− θInT +Ψ = 0, (8)
Ψ  0,Tr(ΨQ) = 0,Q  0,Tr(Q) = 1, (9)
where Θ = (∂Cs(Q)∂Q )
T
. By using the fact ∂h
†Qh
∂Q = (hh
†)T , we have: for case a)
Θ = EhR
{
ρhRh
†
R
1 + ρh†RQhR
}
− EhE
{
ρhEh
†
E
1 + ρh†EQhE
}
(10)
and for case b)
Θ =
ρhRh
†
R
1 + ρh†RQhR
− EhE
{
ρhEh
†
E
1 + ρh†EQhE
}
. (11)
From the KKT conditions (8) and (9), we obtain the equivalent (but without containing the Lagrange
multipliers) conditions for optimal Q consisting of a set of equations given in the following theorem.
Please see Appendix D for details.
Theorem 1: The optimal Q  0 satisfies
QΘ = ΘQ = Tr(QΘ)Q (12)
λmax(Θ) = Tr(QΘ). (13)
The above conditions imply that for the optimal Q, QΘ is a scaled version of Q. Any Q satisfying the
conditions of Theorem 1 is called as KKT solution. In §VII, we propose an algorithm to search for the
KKT solution. Θ is an important variable for the transmitter optimization problem. For the calculation
of Θ, we give the following lemma. The proof is given in Appendix E.
Lemma 4: For z ∼ CN (0,R), it holds
Ez
{
ρzz†
1 + ρz†Qz
}
= ρR1/2U1YU
†
1R
1/2 (14)
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6where Y is a diagonal matrix with (k, k)th entry given by
Ykk =
M∑
j=1,j 6=k
F1(ρdj)− F1(ρdk)
(ρdj − ρdk)
∏M
i 6=j(1− di/dj)
+
F2(ρdk)∏M
i 6=k(1− di/dk)
, k ≤M (15)
Ykk =
M∑
j=1
F1(ρdj)
ρdj
∏M
i 6=j(1− di/dj)
, k > M. (16)
with F2(x) = 1x −
1
x2 e
1/xE1(1/x), and F1(x), E1(x), U1, di, M are defined in Lemma 3.
Based on (14), we can calculate Θ by simply letting R = ΣR or R = ΣE .
In the following, we show that for some special cases, more information about Q than that of Theorem
1 can be obtained.
A. hR is completely known at the transmitter
We will prove that if Cs(Q) > 0 for someQ, then the optimalQ always has rank one, i.e., beamforming
is optimal. We put the proof in the second part of the subsection. In the first part of the subsection, we
analyze how this result reduces our problem to a problem of one variable.
Based on this result, we let Q = uu† with ‖u‖2 = 1 and the problem is reduced to
Cs(Q) = log(1 + ρh
†
Ruu
†hR)− EhE{log(1 + ρh
†
Euu
†hE)} (17)
which, by using (66) and (68), can be rewritten as
Cs(Q) = log(1 + ρu
†hRh
†
Ru)− F1(ρu
†ΣEu). (18)
Let u†hRh†Ru = z‖hR‖
2
. Then 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Note that F1(x) is an increasing function. Thus, for fixed z,
u†ΣEu should be minimized. Define
φ(z) =min
u
u†ΣEu (19)
s.t. u†hRh
†
Ru = z‖hR‖
2, and ‖u‖2 = 1.
Then, our problem is reduced to
Cs(z) = log(1 + ρ‖hR‖
2z)− F1(ρφ(z)), 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. (20)
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7Since the problem of (19) belongs to the class of quadratically constrained quadratic programming
(QCQP) with two constraints, it can be exactly solved [17], and is equivalent to its semidefinite program-
ming (SDP) relaxation, i.e.,
φ(z) =min
X
Tr(ΣEX) (21)
s.t. Tr(hRh
†
RX) = z‖hR‖
2, andTr(X) = 1,
X  0.
For any given z, the problem of (21) is an SDP and can be effectively solved via CVX software [25].
Lemma 5: The function φ(z) is a convex function.
The proof is given in Appendix F.
Since φ(z) is a convex function, according to well-known properties of convex functions, we know
that φ(z) is continuous and Lipschitz continuous [27, Corollary 2.3.1], and is differentiable at all but at
most countably many points (left and right derivatives always exists) [27, Theorem 2.3.4]. Further study
on φ(z) and proposing more effective method for the optimization of Cs(z) can be our future work.
For the special case ΣE = αI (hE has a trivial covariance), (18) becomes
Cs(Q) = log(1 + ρu
†hRh
†
Ru)− F1(ρα). (22)
Obviously, the optimal u = hR/‖hR‖, the optimal Q = hRh†R/‖hR‖2 and
[max
Q
Cs(Q)] = log(1 + ρ‖hR‖
2)− F1(ρα). (23)
This case was considered in [9] and the above result is consistent with that in [9].
Remark: If the optimal u do not achieve Cs(Q) > 0, then Cs(Q) ≤ 0 for any Q.
In the remainder of the subsection, we give the proof for that if Cs(Q) > 0 for some Q, then the
optimal Q always has rank one. We first provide a lemma that will be helpful in the following. The proof
is put in Appendix G.
Lemma 6: Let A be a positive definite matrix, a be a vector. If aa† −A has a positive eigenvalue,
then it has all negative eigenvalues except for a positive eigenvalue.
Via Lemma 6, we can show that, if Cs(Q) > 0, then Θ has all negative eigenvalues except for a
positive eigenvalue. To see why this is the case, recall that
Θ =
ρhRh
†
R
1 + ρh†RQhR
− EhE
{
ρhEh
†
E
1 + ρh†EQhE
}
. (24)
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8According to §V-1 (after Lemma 7), we know that, if Cs(Q) > 0, then Tr(ΘQ) > 0. Thus, Θ has at
least a positive eigenvalue. According to (14), we know that the second term in the right hand side of
(41) is positive definite. Note that the first term in the right hand side of (41) has the form aa†. Thus,
the desired result follows directly from Lemma 6.
From Theorem 1, we know that the optimal Q and its associated Θ are commutable. Thus, there exists
a unitary matrix U0 that simultaneously diagonalizes Q and Θ. Let ΛQ and ΛΘ be the corresponding
diagonal matrices. From (12) in Theorem 1, we know that
ΛQΛΘ = Tr(ΘQ)ΛQ (25)
or equivalently,
(ΛQ)kk(ΛΘ)kk = Tr(ΘQ)(ΛQ)kk, k = 1, · · · , nT . (26)
Since Tr(ΘQ) > 0, it follows from (26) that, if (ΛQ)kk > 0, then (ΛΘ)kk = Tr(ΘQ) > 0. However,
ΛΘ has all negative diagonal entries except for a positive one. Thus, ΛQ has only one nonzero diagonal
entry, i.e, the optimal Q has rank one.
B. Only statistical information on hR available at the transmitter and ΣE = αI
During this subsection, we assume thatΣR has simple spectrum (all eigenvalues are distinct), since mul-
tiple eigenvalues are rare for generic Hermitian matrices [19, §4]. Let ΣR have the eigen-decomposition
ΣR = VRΛRV
†
R where ΛR = diag(η1, · · · , ηnT ), η1 > η2 > · · · > ηnT . We use Theorem 1 to
show that the optimal Q has the same eigenvectors as ΣR, i.e., V†RQVR is diagonal, denoted by
Λ = diag(ζ1, · · · , ζnT ). Using this result, our problem is reduced to
Cs(Q) = Ehw{log(1 + ρh
†
wΛ
1/2
R ΛΛ
1/2
R hw)}
− Ehw{log(1 + αρh
†
wΛhw)}
= Ehw{log(1 + ρ
∑nT
i=1
ηiζi|hw,i|
2)}
− Ehw{log(1 + αρ
∑nT
i=1
ζi|hw,i|
2)}. (27)
The power constraint is
∑nT
i=1 ζi = 1. For the case nT = 2, (27) becomes
Cs(Q) = Ehw{log(1 + ρη1ζ1|hw,1|
2 + ρη2(1− ζ1)|hw,2|
2)}
− Ehw{log(1 + αρζ1|hw,1|
2 + αρ(1− ζ1)|hw,2|
2)}. (28)
The constraint is 0 ≤ ζ1 ≤ 1. Similarly to §III, the expectations in (27) and (28) can be expressed in
explicit form.
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9In the remainder of the subsection, we give the proof. LetQ have the eigen-decompositionQ = VΛV†
where Λ is diagonal. According to Appendix E, we express Θ as
Θ = Ehw
{
ρΣ
1
2
Rhwh
†
wΣ
1
2
R
1 + ρh†wΣ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
Rhw
}
− Ehw
{
αρhwh
†
w
1 + αρh†wQhw
}
. (29)
Let Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R = A and let A have the eigen-decomposition A = VAΛAV
†
A where
ΛA = diag(λ1J1, λ2J2, · · · , λKJK), (30)
λ1 > λ2 > · · · > λK−1 > λK ≥ 0 are distinct eigenvalues, and Jk’s are identity matrices. By using the
fact that Uhw and hw have the identical distributions for any unitary matrix U, we express Θ as
Θ = Σ
1/2
R VAY0V
†
AΣ
1/2
R −VZ0V
† (31)
where
Y0 = Ehw
{
ρhwh
†
w
1 + ρh†wΛAhw
}
, (32)
Z0 = Ehw
{
αρhwh
†
w
1 + αρh†wΛhw
}
. (33)
Similarly to Appendix E, it can be shown that Y0 and Z0 are both diagonal.
Observe that VZ0V† and Q are commutable. With this, from Theorem 1, we know that Θ and Q are
commutable which enables us to get
Σ
1/2
R VAY0V
†
AΣ
1/2
R Q = QΣ
1/2
R VAY0V
†
AΣ
1/2
R . (34)
By inserting Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R = VAΛAV
†
A into (34), we get
ΣRVAY0ΛAV
†
A = VAΛAY0V
†
AΣR. (35)
Since ΛA and Y0 are both diagonal matrices, it holds that Y0ΛA = ΛAY0. With this, by inserting
ΣR = VRΛRV
†
R into (35), we get
ΛRV0ΛAY0V
†
0 = V0ΛAY0V
†
0ΛR (36)
where V0 = V†RVA. From (36) and the assumption that all diagonal entries of ΛR are distinct, we know
that V0ΛAY0V†0 is a diagonal matrix [22, Special matrices: diagonal]. On the other hand, it follows
from Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R = VAΛAV
†
A that Q = Σ
−1/2
R VAΛAV
†
AΣ
−1/2
R which, when combined with the fact that
ΣR = VRΛRV
†
R, results in
Q = VRΛ
−1/2
R (V0ΛAV
†
0)Λ
−1/2
R V
†
R. (37)
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Next, we show that V0ΛAV†0 is diagonal. Since V0ΛAY0V
†
0 is diagonal, there exists a V1, which
is the column-permuted version of V0, such that V1ΛAY0V†1 = ΛAY0, or equivalently, V1ΛAY0 =
ΛAY0V1. We aim to prove that V1ΛA = ΛAV1. According to (30), (32), (76), (77), it is not difficult
to show that ΛAY0 has the form of
ΛAY0 = diag(λ
′
1J1, λ
′
2J2, · · · , λ
′
KJK) (38)
where λ′1 > λ′2 > · · · > λ′K−1 > 0, λ′K ≥ 0, and λ′K 6= λ′k for k = 1, · · · ,K− 1. From (38) and the fact
that V1ΛAY0 = ΛAY0V1, we know that V1 has the form of V1 = diag(A1,A2, · · · ,AK), where each
Ak is the same size as the corresponding Jk [22, Special matrices: diagonal]. Thus, it is easy to verify
that V1ΛA = ΛAV1, or equivalently, V1ΛAV†1 = ΛA. Therefore, since V1 is the column-permuted
matrix of V0, it follows that V0ΛAV†0 is diagonal. With this, from (37), we know that the optimal Q
has the same eigenvectors as ΣR.
V. DEPENDENCE OF Cs(Q) ON ρ
In this section we investigate how the SNR, ρ, impacts the ergodic secrecy rate.
1) Full CSI on hR at the transmitter: We first provide a lemma that will be helpful in the following.
The proof is given in Appendix H.
Lemma 7: For a positive constant x and a positive random variable Y , the following fact holds:
log x > E(log Y ) =⇒
1
x
< E
(
1
Y
)
. (39)
Here, =⇒ means that the right side follows from the left side.
By using Lemma 7, we can prove that, if Cs(Q) > 0, then Tr(ΘQ) > 0. To see why this is the case,
we let x = 1 + ρh†RQhR and Y = 1 + ρh
†
EQhE which enables us to write
Cs(Q) = log x− E(log Y ) (40)
Tr(ΘQ) = E
(
1
Y
)
−
1
x
. (41)
The desired result follows from Lemma 7.
Taking the derivative of Cs(Q) with respect to ρ, we get:
∂Cs(Q)
∂ρ
=
h
†
RQhR
1 + ρh†RQhR
− EhE
{
h
†
EQhE
1 + ρh†EQhE
}
=
Tr(ΘQ)
ρ
. (42)
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Based on the fact that, if Cs(Q) > 0, then Tr(ΘQ) > 0, we get that if Cs(Q) > 0, then ∂Cs(Q)∂ρ > 0.
Thus, if Cs(Q) > 0 for some Q, then more power should achieve larger secrecy rate. In other words,
we should use the maximum power.
2) Statistical information on hR at the transmitter: In this case, we deal with the situation ΣR  ΣE .
Taking the derivative of Cs(Q) with respect to ρ, we get:
∂Cs(Q)
∂ρ
=
1
ρ
Ehw
{
1
1 + ρh†wΣ
1/2
E QΣ
1/2
E hw
}
−
1
ρ
Ehw
{
1
1 + ρh†wΣ
1/2
R QΣ
1/2
R hw
}
. (43)
Here, we have used (58) and (59) in Appendix A. According to Ostrowski theorem [24, p. 224], we
know that if A  B and B ≻ 0, then λk(A1/2QA1/2) ≥ λk(B1/2QB1/2), where λk(·) denotes the kth
eigenvalue arranged in decreasing order. Since ΣR  ΣE , similarly to the methodology in Appendix A,
it is easy to prove that ∂Cs(Q)∂ρ > 0. Thus, more power should achieve larger secrecy rate. In other words,
we should use the maximum power.
Remarks: For the situation ΣR  ΣE , whether or not Cs(Q) > 0 imply that ∂Cs(Q)∂ρ > 0 has not been
proved. This can be our future work.
VI. THE OPTIMAL Q UNDER HIGH SNR
In this subsection, we give an analysis for high SNR, i.e., ρ→∞. Our results show that for high SNR,
the optimal Q has rank one, i.e., beamforming is optimal. The detailed analysis is given as follows.
A. Full CSI about hR at the transmitter
According to §IV-A, the optimal Q always has rank one. Let Q = uu† with ‖u‖2 = 1.
For high SNR, by using the fact that log(1 + x) ≈ log x for large x, we write
Cs(Q) ≈ log(ρh
†
Ruu
†hR)− EhE{log(ρh
†
Euu
†hE)}
= log(u†hRh
†
Ru)− Ehw{log(h
†
wΣ
1/2
E uu
†Σ
1/2
E hw)}
= log(u†hRh
†
Ru)− Ehw,1{log(u
†ΣEu|hw,1|
2)}
= log(u†hRh
†
Ru)− log(u
†ΣEu)− E{log |hw,1|
2}
= log
u†hRh
†
Ru
u†ΣEu
+ γ
≤ log(h†RΣ
−1
E hR) + γ (44)
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where we have used the fact that Uhw and hw have identical distributions for any unitary matrix U,
and E{log |hw,1|2} = −γ where γ = 0.577216 · · · is the Euler’s constant (since 2|hw,1|2 ∼ χ2(2),
i.e., the chi-square distribution with degree of freedom 2). In (44), the maximum is achieved when
u = Σ−1E hR/‖Σ
−1/2
E hR‖.
B. Statistics information about hR at the transmitter
For high SNR, similarly, we write
Cs(Q)
≈ EhR{log(ρh
†
RQhR)} − EhE{log(ρh
†
EQhE)}
= Ehw{log(h
†
wΣ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
Rhw)} − Ehw{log(h
†
wΣ
1
2
EQΣ
1
2
Ehw)}
= Ehw{log
∑nT
k=1
ak|hw,k|
2} − Ehw{log
∑nT
k=1
bk|hw,k|
2}
= Ehw
{
log
∑nT
k=1 ak|hw,k|
2∑nT
k=1 bk|hw,k|
2
}
(45)
where ak’s and bk’s are the eigenvalues of Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R and Σ
1
2
EQΣ
1
2
E arranged in decreasing order, respec-
tively, and we have used the fact that Uhw and hw have the identical distributions for any unitary matrix
U. Let p1 and pnT be the largest and smallest eigenvalues of Σ
1
2
RΣ
−1
E Σ
1
2
R. By writing
Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R = Σ
1
2
RΣ
− 1
2
E
(
Σ
1
2
EQΣ
1
2
E
)
Σ
− 1
2
E Σ
1
2
R (46)
and applying Ostrowski theorem [24, p. 224], we have
ak = bkθk, pnT ≤ θk ≤ p1(k = 1, · · · , nT ). (47)
Since rank(Σ
1
2
RQΣ
1
2
R) = rank(Σ
1
2
EQΣ
1
2
E), the number of non-zero elements of ak’ and bk’s is the same,
denoted by n. Thus, from (47), we have[
max
k=1,··· ,n
ak
bk
]
≤ p1 = λmax(Σ
1
2
RΣ
−1
E Σ
1
2
R). (48)
To proceed, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 8: For xk > 0, yk > 0, k = 1, · · · , n, it holds
x1 + · · ·+ xn
y1 + · · ·+ yn
≤ max
k=1,··· ,n
xk
yk
. (49)
The proof is simple: it is based on the following
a+ b
c+ d
≤ max
{a
c
,
b
d
}
, ∀a, b, c, d > 0. (50)
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From (48), using Lemma 8, we get that: for any hw 6= 0,∑nT
k=1 ak|hw,k|
2∑nT
k=1 bk|hw,k|
2
=
∑n
k=1 ak|hw,k|
2∑n
k=1 bk|hw,k|
2
≤ max
k=1,··· ,n
ak
bk
≤ λmax(Σ
1
2
RΣ
−1
E Σ
1
2
R). (51)
In (51), the maximum is achieved simultaneously for any hw 6= 0 whenQ = u0u†0, u0 = Σ
− 1
2
E x0/‖Σ
− 1
2
E x0‖
with x0 being the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue ofΣ
− 1
2
E ΣRΣ
− 1
2
E , and correspondingly,
a1 = u
†
0ΣRu0, b1 = u
†
0ΣEu0, a2 = · · · = anT = 0, b2 = · · · = bnT = 0, i.e., n = 1. To see why this is
the case, noting that λmax(Σ
1
2
RΣ
−1
E Σ
1
2
R) = λmax(Σ
− 1
2
E ΣRΣ
− 1
2
E ), it is easy to verify that
a1
b1
=
x
†
0Σ
− 1
2
E ΣRΣ
− 1
2
E x0
x
†
0x0
= λmax(Σ
− 1
2
E ΣRΣ
− 1
2
E ). (52)
The desired result follows. Now, combining (45) and (51), we have
Cs(Q) ≈ Ehw
{
log
∑nT
k=1 ak|hw,k|
2∑nT
k=1 bk|hw,k|
2
}
≤ log(λmax(Σ
1
2
RΣ
−1
E Σ
1
2
R)). (53)
In (53), the maximum is achieved when Q = u0u†0. Thus, the optimal Q has rank one.
VII. FIXED POINT ITERATION
In this section we propose an algorithm to search for the KKT solution according to Theorem 1.
When Θ and Q commute, Θ + γInT and Q commute for any real number γ, and vice versa. Let
γ = (1 + β)max{0,−λmin(Θ)}, β > 0 and let K = Θ+ γInT . It holds that K ≻ 0. From (12), we get
KQ = Tr(KQ)Q. (54)
Equation (54) looks like the eigenvalue equation Ax = λx, where Tr(KQ) is the eigenvalue and Q is
the corresponding eigenvector. Recall that the power iteration method is a classical method for computing
the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of a matrix [21, p. 533]
xk+1 =
Axk
‖Axk‖
, k = 0, 1, · · · . (55)
We can derive the similar algorithm. Note that there is a difference between (54) and the eigenvalue
equation: Q is a Hermitian matrix. Thus, the iteration (55) cannot be used directly. From (54), since K
and Q commute, thus, we have that KQ = K1/2QK1/2 and hence
Q =
K1/2QK1/2
Tr(K1/2QK1/2)
, f(Q). (56)
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Note that f(Q)  0 and Tr(f(Q)) = 1 for any Q ∈ Ω. The equation (56) defines a mapping from a
convex set to itself: Ω → Ω, Q 7→ f(Q). The optimal Q corresponds to a fixed point of f(Q), i.e.,
f(Q◦) = Q◦. To search for the KKT solution, the iterative expression is
Qk+1 = f(Qk), k = 0, 1, · · · (57)
The initial point Q0 can be set to InT /nT , or any Q0 ∈ Ω. The iterations stop when the relative error
of Cs(Q) in the successive iterations is less than a preset value, e.g., 10−3 or 10−6. If the convergent Q
satisfies (13), we obtain a KKT solution, otherwise, we choose a different initial point.
VIII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section we provide some examples to illustrate the theoretical findings. We assume that ΣR is
normalized as Tr(ΣR) = nT , and ΣE is multiplied correspondingly by a factor η. In simulations, we
assume that the correlation matrices of legitimate and eavesdropper channels follow the Jakes’ correlation
model [18], i.e., for p, q = 1, · · · , nT
ΣR(p, q) = J0
(
φR|p− q|2πd/λ
)
,
ΣE(p, q) = ηJ0
(
φE|p − q|2πd/λ
)
where J0(·) is the zero-order Bessel function of the first kind, d is the element spacing, λ is the
wavelength, and φR (or φE) is a parameter that controls the correlation among antennas and has its
value determined by the distance between the transmitter and receiver, and the incident angle of the
wavefront. We set d/λ = 1/2.
A. The transmitter has full information about the legitimate channel and only statistical information
about the eavesdropper channel
We consider a MISO wiretap channel where nT = 4, nR = nE = 1. We set hR = [0.4282 +
0.0403i, 0.8956+0.6771i, 0.7310+0.5689i, 0.5779− 0.2556i]T and φE = 0.3, η = 0.3. The eigenvalues
of hRh†R −ΣE are 2.0946,−0.0020,−0.1584,−0.4315.
Fig. 2 depicts the function Cs(z) defined in (20) for z in [0.01, 0.99] with step 0.01 and SNR = 10dB.
Among these points, the optimal point is (0.55, 2.8413) also depicted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 3 depicts the ergodic secrecy rates during the iteration of the algorithm of Section §VII for
SNR = 10dB and Q0 = 14I4. The convergent ergodic secrecy rate is 2.8413. We can see that the
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algorithm converges rapidly. If we do 300 iterations for SNR = 10dB and Q0 = 14I4, the convergent
values are:
λ(Q) = {1.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0000},
λ(Θ) = {0.4385,−0.0105,−1.3155,−2.2006}
Tr(ΘQ) = 0.4385.
Fig. 4 plots the ergodic secrecy rates for different φE from 0.2 to 0.9. It can be seen from Fig. 4 that
the ergodic secrecy rate decreases first, and then increases with φE . Fig. 5 plots the ergodic secrecy rates
for different SNR and φE = 0.3. As is revealed in §V, the ergodic secrecy rate increases with SNR.
B. The transmitter has only statistical information about both the legitimate channel and the eavesdropper
channel
We set φR = 0.5, φE = 0.3, η = 0.3. The eigenvalues of ΣR−ΣE are 1.3503, 0.9848, 0.4432, 0.0217.
Fig. 6 depicts the ergodic secrecy rates during the iteration for SNR = 10dB and Q0 = 14I4, while
Fig. 7 depicts the ergodic secrecy rates for 30 random Q0 ∈ Ω. We can see that the algorithm converges
rapidly. If we do 300 iterations for SNR = 10dB and Q0 = 14I4, the convergent values are:
λ(Q) = {0.5129, 0.4871, 0.0000, 0.0000},
λ(Θ) = {0.7452, 0.7452,−2.5972,−5.4438}
Tr(ΘQ) = 0.7452.
We can see that the convergent Q has rank two.
Fig. 8 plots the ergodic secrecy rates for different φR from 0.4 to 0.9. It can be seen from Fig. 8
that the ergodic secrecy rate increases with φR. Fig. 9 plots the ergodic secrecy rates for different φE
from 0.2 to 0.4. Fig. 10 plots the ergodic secrecy rates for different SNR. As is revealed in §V, when
ΣR ≻ ΣE , the ergodic secrecy rate increases with SNR.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of finding the optimal input covariance matrix that achieves ergodic
secrecy capacity subject to a power constraint. We extend the existing result to nontrivial covariances of
the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. We have derived the necessary conditions for the optimal input
covariance matrix in the form of a set of equations and propose an algorithm to solve the equations.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove the result in two parts. First, we prove that if ΣE − ΣR  0, then Cs ≤ 0. Since hR ∼
CN (0,ΣR), hE ∼ CN (0,ΣE), we can write
hR = Σ
1/2
R hw, (58)
hE = Σ
1/2
E hw. (59)
By inserting (58) and (59) into (4), we get
Cs(Q) = Ehw{log(1 + ρh
†
wΣ
1/2
R QΣ
1/2
R hw)}
− Ehw{log(1 + ρh
†
wΣ
1/2
E QΣ
1/2
E hw)}. (60)
Let x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xnT and y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ ynT be eigenvalues of Σ
1/2
R QΣ
1/2
R and Σ
1/2
E QΣ
1/2
E ,
respectively. By using the fact that Uhw and hw have the identical distributions for any unitary matrix
U, we have
Cs(Q) = Ehw
{
log
(
1 + ρ
nT∑
i=1
xi|hw,i|
2
)}
− Ehw
{
log
(
1 + ρ
nT∑
i=1
yi|hw,i|
2
)}
. (61)
According to Ostrowski theorem [24, p. 224], we know that ifA  B andB ≻ 0, then λk(A1/2QA1/2) ≥
λk(B
1/2QB1/2), where λk(·) denotes the kth eigenvalue arranged in decreasing order. With this, we know
that xi ≤ yi, i = 1, · · · , nT . On the other hand, it is easy to verify that the following function
g(z1, · · · , znT ) = Ehw
{
log
(
1 + ρ
nT∑
i=1
zi|hw,i|
2
)}
(62)
is strictly increasing with respect to zi, i = 1, · · · , nT . Thus, we get that Cs(Q) ≤ 0 for any Q. This
completes the first part.
Second, we prove that if ΣR − ΣE is none negative semi-definite, then there exists a Q such that
Cs(Q) > 0. Let u be the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue λ of ΣR − ΣE . Since
λ > 0, we get that u†(ΣR − ΣE)u = λ > 0 and u†ΣRu > u†ΣEu. We will prove that Q = uu†
achieves Cs(Q) > 0. In this case, we know that x1 = u†ΣRu, x2 = · · · = xnT = 0, y1 = u†ΣEu and
y2 = · · · = ynT = 0. Since x1 > y1 and the function g(z1, · · · , znT ) defined in (62) is strictly increasing
with respect to z1, we get that Cs(Q) > 0. This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
From (5) and (59), we get
Cs(Q) = log(1 + ρh
†
RQhR)
− Ehw{log(1 + ρh
†
wΣ
1/2
E QΣ
1/2
E hw)}. (63)
It follows from the Jensen’s inequality [26, p. 25] that logE(x) ≥ E(log x). With this and the fact that
Ehw{h
†
wAhw} = Ehw{Tr(Ahwh
†
w)} = Tr(A), we get
Cs(Q) ≥ log(1 + ρh
†
RQhR)− log(1 + ρTr(QΣE)). (64)
Note that h†RQhR−Tr(QΣE) = Tr(Q(hRh
†
R−ΣE)). Let u be the eigenvector associated with the largest
eigenvalue λ of hRh†R−ΣE . Since λ > 0, we know that Tr(uu†(hRh
†
R−ΣE)) = u
†(hRh
†
R−ΣE)u =
λ > 0. Thus, Cs(Q) > 0 holds for Q = uu†. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
From [11, Eq. (64)], we know
Ez{log(1 + ρz
†Qz)}
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
t
(
1−
1
det(I+ tρR1/2QR1/2)
)
dt. (65)
By inserting R1/2QR1/2 = U1D1U†1 into (65), we get
Ez{log(1 + ρz
†Qz)} =
∫ ∞
0
e−t
(
1
t
−
1
t
∏M
i=1(1 + tρdi)
)
dt. (66)
Performing partial fraction expansion, i.e.,
1
t
−
1
t
∏M
i=1(1 + tρdi)
=
M∑
j=1
ρdj∏M
i 6=j(1− di/dj)
e−t
1 + tρdj
(67)
and using ∫ ∞
0
e−t
1 + ta
dt =
1
a
F1(a), (68)
we get (6). This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
It follows from (9) thatΨQ = QΨ = 0, that is,Ψ andQ commute and have the same eigenvectors [23,
p.239] and their eigenvalue patterns are complementary in the sense that if λi(Q) > 0, then λi(Ψ) = 0,
and vice versa [14]. This result, when combined with (8), implies that Θ and Q commute and have the
same eigenvectors. Further, we get ΘQ = QΘ = θQ, which, when combined with Tr(Q) = 1 and the
fact Tr(QΘ) is always real, leads to θ = Tr(QΘ) and (12) (also see [15]).
The condition (12) reveals that for the optimalQ, QΘ is a scaled version of Q. Further, the eigenvalues
of Θ corresponding to the positive eigenvalues of Q are all equal to Tr(QΘ), while the remaining
eigenvalues of Θ are all less than or equal to Tr(QΘ), which follows from (8), (12) and Ψ  0. Based
on the above (13) follows.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Denote the expectation in the left hand side of (14) as I . We write z = R1/2hw where hw =
[hw,1, · · · , hw,nT ]
T ∼ CN (0, InT ), and hw,k’s follow i.i.d. CN (0, 1). With this, we have
I = Ehw
{
ρR1/2hwh
†
wR
1/2
1 + ρh†wR1/2QR1/2hw
}
. (69)
By inserting R1/2QR1/2 = U1D1U†1 into (69), we have
I = ρR1/2Ehw
{
hwh
†
w
1 + ρh†wU1D1U
†
1hw
}
R1/2. (70)
Then we use the fact that Uhw and hw have the identical distributions for any unitary matrix U to obtain
I = ρR1/2U1YU
†
1R
1/2 (71)
where
Y = Ehw
{
hwh
†
w
1 + ρh†wD1hw
}
(72)
with (i, j)th entries given by
Yij = Ehw
{
hw,ih
∗
w,j
1 + ρ
∑M
k=1 dk|hw,k|
2
}
. (73)
From the gamma integral [16] we have
1
az
=
1
Γ(z)
∫ ∞
0
tz−1e−tadt, Re(z) > 0, a > 0 (74)
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where Γ(z) =
∫∞
0 u
z−1e−udu, we let z = 1 to obtain 1a =
∫∞
0 e
−tadt. With this identity, we can write
Yij =
∫ ∞
0
e−tEhw
{
hw,ih
∗
w,j
M∏
k=1
e−tρdk|hw,k|
2
}
dt. (75)
Since hw,k’s follow i.i.d. CN (0, 1), we know Yij = 0 for i 6= j, i.e., Y is a diagonal matrix with (k, k)th
entries given by
Ykk =
∫ ∞
0
e−t∏M
i=1(1 + tρdi)
1
1 + tρdk
dt, k ≤M (76)
Ykk =
∫ ∞
0
e−t∏M
i=1(1 + tρdi)
dt, k > M. (77)
These integrals can be easily calculated. Performing partial fraction expansion
1∏M
i=1(1 + tρdi)
=
M∑
j=1
1∏M
i 6=j(1− di/dj)
1
1 + tρdj
(78)
and using (68) and ∫ ∞
0
e−t
(1 + ta)(1 + tb)
dt =
F1(a)− F1(b)
a− b
(79)
∫ ∞
0
e−t
(1 + ta)2
dt = F2(a), (80)
we get (14). This completes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We need to prove that
φ(tz1 + (1− t)z2) ≤ tφ(z1) + (1− t)φ(z2), ∀t ∈ [0, 1]. (81)
Let X1 and X2 be the optimal X associated with z1 and z2. Consider the problem associated with
tz1 + (1− t)z2, i.e.,
min
X
Tr(ΣEX) (82)
s.t. Tr(hRh
†
RX) = (tz1 + (1− t)z2)‖hR‖
2,
Tr(X) = 1,
X  0.
It is easy to verify that tX1 + (1 − t)X2 satisfies the constraints in the problem of (82) with the
corresponding objective value tφ(z1) + (1− t)φ(z2). Thus, (81) holds and φ(z) is a convex function.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Let λ > 0 be an eigenvalue of aa† −A, and we have
det(aa† −A− λI) = 0. (83)
Note that A+ λI is positive definite. By using the identity det(B− aa†) = (1− a†B−1a) det(B) for a
positive definite matrix B, it follows from (83) that
1− a†(A+ λI)−1a = 0. (84)
Denote ℓ(λ) , 1− a†(A+ λI)−1a. It is easy to verify that ℓ(λ) is a strictly increasing function. Thus,
ℓ(λ) has only one positive root, and ℓ(0) 6= 0, i.e., 0 is not a eigenvalue of aa† − A. Thus, all other
eigenvalues are negative. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
We have
log x > E(log Y ) =⇒ E
(
log
x
Y
)
> 0. (85)
By using Jensen’s inequality [26, p. 25], we have
logE
( x
Y
)
≥ E
(
log
x
Y
)
=⇒ E
( x
Y
)
> 1
=⇒ xE
(
1
Y
)
> 1
=⇒
1
x
< E
(
1
Y
)
. (86)
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Fig. 2. The function Cs(z), z = 0.01 : 0.01 : 0.99. Full CSI on hR is used, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 3. Ergodic secrecy rate during the iteration. Full CSI on hR is used; Q0 = 1
4
I4, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate for different values of φE . Full CSI on hR is used; Q0 = 1
4
I4, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy rate for different SNR. Full CSI on hR is used.
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Fig. 6. Ergodic secrecy rate during the iteration. Only statistical info. on hR is used; Q0 = 14I4, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rate during the iteration. Only statistical info. on hR is used; 30 random Q0, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 8. Ergodic secrecy rate for different values of φR. Only statistical info. on hR is used; Q0 = 14I4, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 9. Ergodic secrecy rate for different values of φE . Only statistical info. on hR is used; Q0 = 1
4
I4, SNR = 10 dB.
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Fig. 10. Ergodic secrecy rate for different SNR. Only statistical info. on hR is used.
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